

9-21-15

As I was organizing our ... study

(JFK proposed...!)

(+JFK was planning to
make public deal the
next day)

(Sizeland - 1 day)

Being drawn back that
morning from it, and
postponing ending crisis

(Chris - kept driving (driver of car was
drif, and truck had a wire in it)

SPY - B-59

(water, 8-130')

What led to this moment

(Mammy - no days of K leaving
but US aircraft (the real days...)

not days

blockade:

rebo

K reaches

Frontiers

must get in
understand...

Plane Number

Oct. 2002 - known for freq? (agrees)

What have we learned?

en to
Jul 2003

on the record (class.) nothing...

Pitts

brought
What brought me to 5 PM # 10-27

(File - Torrey calls, DDC's

for October 8th Knicker?

met to Burn - Clare mention

(me on radio, since 2002?)

When expressing prosecution? (Oxford?!) (JFK from of Long /
C-I many it NSA?!
back...

RFK - what if missiles?

* JFK statements 9-3, 9-16 - in belief (K' + NIE'

MCN: only this!

no MRBM's

Sorenson - If we thought

^{before JFK, MCB}
"Kenny has it first!"

A had to be

|| (What JFK found!

|| on PSACM!

(JCS back know - give PSACM
presence

JFK has denial mission!

(most front more leads -

"early mission, attacks!"

"If B-54 had covered me..."

(JCS: "...")

[Q] are: When did JFK give up intent in mission?

late July, early August - SC committed (Berlin)

(Would JFK have preferred Cuba / Berlin crisis

begin action? or to postpone it (if it was
certain)

D: Blockade give up attack - make long bluff

Seung: NIE doesn't know Mugosa!
(in in November?! ^{Post-Martin})

OR mission planning,
Oct 1-2

SU: tax news

Torpedoes

if sub had been "attacked" Oct 24?

Fri night Moscow = K drivers to baggage.
Sat morning VFK again to baggage

(Monday)

AA

U-2 (refers to firing of AA; like Saints)

sub B-59

Fri night? (Munich): tax news (not any in mission
Okinawa: forces)

Shivers

9-22-15

It was dangerous > 10%

Others were more
right than he was
(I was wrong)

and

Not for man's public thought

I was right that they were wrong
about that.

(Did JFK commit atrocities like (Kinstein
to present)

JFK had to fool/bluff Congress and JCS/air.
no will at K

(He was too coming to Castro

what he signaled')

AA! not

(In the end, he didn't fool JCS' on Cuba or VN
or CTB

He was naïve of K, wrong,
NATO, US -

Just it for JCS (& for C-I, Kase,

(and that matter?) Boris Wall,
VN, PTB, Am Univ.

(Costs: (like Oriskany)

He deserves credit for not

doing what hanks wanted: Oct 16-27

~~that~~ Why deserve credit for Wien -

at risk of the war
Mach, big long

(against his brother
instincts)

(and for slaying his instincts,
hank's COOP

9-22-15

"We" thought it wasn't a nuclear crisis —
it was!

It was a Berlin - Cuba crisis, as K thought.

It was not purely "Crisis Crisis" as K said,
though partly

K said and intent to press on Berlin,
(after winning challenge in Cuba) as he
said — he wasn't bluffing, or highly deliberately
mis-directing.

(+ he still cared — about GDR
(more than Berlin) & NATO)

— I questioned Oct 22 — "If one (?) is right..."
(I didn't believe either side of this)

I questioned: If 10% chance — ASW?!
(attack?)
(My values were right)

I was not worried about SU MRBMs

Rightly so

or blockade

(except what? Not)

(P~~re~~pared - like TG, Aug 2 1964

ONLY
TIME

Whole stream of decisions brought forward
to that point - where one man did
have to decide, a plausible target,
authentic (was this a - 2 equal) machines/origin
to fire (2 vs. 1)

(like false alarm - Fulton 1993?
Patton - 1983 (Pentagon
1962 False alarm)

(N 1969 ?!

PBSG: no mention of Mungson
on falling of ... (Slaughter (sic!) - CW
"destroy" as

(as Berlin

of falling on JFK

on JFK vs. JCS / bombs

9-22-15

This is not a story of the long '60's
or of the Cold War -

It is a story of the nuclear era
which we are still in -

the FS/FD era (now for both
CF, Deep, etc. US, R, I, Is, Pak,
Exposed areas of "commitment" China

distinct
invariable local balance of war-we forces
("neo-colonies")

"need for FD threats"
are apparent

We weren't really involved.

meetings Cuba

not, "the other chunk"

SU would have wanted to see not
any to protect Cuba! (of Berlin!)

- Latin American, Cuba!

Communist rules!

So not (anyway) ~~indicates~~ was crisis!
Khrushchev

"to prevent a new war" (OK)

"keep SU from being too strong"

JFK bluff / communist SU rules

as Castro uses ideology

(to not know either to JFK will

make mistakes

"ANY NECESSARY!"

- but no more threatening

(at least of American crisis)

going - both (all) what

not public

9-28-15

FR

Int R knew what VPK said:

- He said to find SAM at 0-2
(begin - out of control)
- Costa AA (fully better)

- [unclear]

[unclear]

Ream - miss

Gen F. Phillips

Link of safety began

1961 - moon BMEWS

first at

Nov 24 '61 (Surrey: Portledge)

Oct 26-27 0-2 into SU 102A with me

Oct 24 62

Oct 25

Oct 26 8AM John Linn (but

9-25-15

Is this is not end, what is?

London is Berlin, ...

(What if this came after Babushka
had been decided?)

("If you go first, I will...")
(JFK couldn't back down in front of Clay!)

(Even before K feared pressure from
hanks was preparation
mission mission
when there was
urgency!)

("BPM" can lead you astray!)

And JFK wants to attack: on Kennedy, etc...
with Shandy (McLean committed his?!)
("not McLean")

Werner, Kyoung

as was he bluffing from beginning,
as from Tuesday? Wade

(X)

JFK had not only to (be seen to) take risks, he
had to threaten mission 1) to reassure JCS, until...

2) to score public + allies, so they would
3) K? so he will
accepted ending - only, not Berlin except a trade

Chatter (+K) was not "paranoid"

or negatively USE directed
for some feel as others reasons

9-25-15

"We" fear loss of dominance economically in
Europe (new, East Eur.)

Japan

Central & North America

Mexico,

to trade with Russia
+ China

or rise of Germany
+ France

R fears: loss of dominance of non-aligned
+ R!

(K might depend for influence in L.A. + TW)

Israel

France allied with USSR

NK

(then, if it could)

Pak

VS. "Better dead than Red"

JFK ~~intended to~~ intention to declare if necessary
can too late to prevent would big mistake
that afternoon

5 o'clock

(Bullfight) critics

It was a bull-fight

argument

CORRIDOR

(but bull dead... Ames)

BW on horns

9-24-15

JFK: "Or else" — "I will win" Glee
"I will see in VN"
I will

Dejeans

bs

(after saying, basically, I will not see
in C-I: ^{JCS} of orient balance
He seemed to promote his ~~vision~~
[the he called] "control" his
(also, LBJ in VN?)
He would have looked
(Disposal problem)

Petrovich is, BHO in Africa

(next, Syria? Iraq? (Hobbs, after
= VN '67)

9-22-15

~~JFK~~ JFK couldn't have quit by Sunday
morning

or afternoon?

K might have quit by Sunday
evening (OC) - 24 hrs

JFK had given his word Monday night
(RFR to me)

So JFK could hold off quitting
until (Monday afternoon)

K couldn't

Without C, JFK wins, too - K can't
wait 45-48 hours, JFK can.

Thanks to C (+ two more) K quits Sunday morning,

no "tightening
belts"

instead of Sunday evening or Monday

If subs haven't blown up...

Roscoe: check!

(B-36 on surface - didn't explode)

Sullivan:

"altare" (a shell it? Maple!)

IC Error: orders to ^{be ready to} attack Pearl Harbor

only details

+ Hunters

main subs

+ mission fleet!

(Not, Turkey!)

w. news

even in GW?

no CBMs
on Pearl!

well, no need to
prepare for that!

WATO: bluff or not? after ... 1958? 1960?
9-22-15

Sept 5 bluff (Aug '56)
Sept 12 internal SU umbrella over Cuba / Sept 1973?
Sept 16 internal (only real case? (1969: N/VN?))

Sept 21
CKMong; Iran; Iraq CW
Sept 21 2 are out; like US to UR take away
data non-rec US on Europe (1 paper)
attack/stabilize on Berlin (books)

now, over eastern Ukraine!

"umbrella" — minimum (deliberately misleads,
crossing)

like Star Wars "shield" "dome" ^{Chomsky} ^{Dome}

(UCS — no shield!)

rather, instead of real strategic
deterrence

(non-fears: checks)
check)

"Now on for strategy" — BUREAU

yet — not entering

C-II — each believed other's bluff

enough to be deterred from attacking — but

not of COSE-COSE
COSE

not from duplicating, threatening (bluffing + taking some risk)

X (externalities
IGNORED.) C-II by Sept 30? out 10?

(unconventional,
misconstrued,
Bottleneck line
by end of year)

to Navy: cut down C-II
+ FU cases

80-90%

Danger: 2 NWS:

A) US-R

B) Iran-Pak

C → as many doctors

C) Amal or US vs. NNWS

as Amal or US vs. crisis in WWII

1-2M?

~ .9 + .6 + .3 = 1.8M

(m .9 + .3 + ? = US deliberate kill win (Terror))

Friendship is Machon's bluff

"I will" (real) \rightarrow I may

(less real;

but still real,

billable,

uncommensal

intolerable

+ backing still, now

(the campaign of 2016

= 2004/08 (the)

NOW - MAOs & both?!

this time, vs. NWS

(as if $A = (B =) C$

Even without snake/winter,

$\Rightarrow A = C$

John was wrong in 1982

" = "Hiroshi (A-
base)"

on what 1961 - as estimated by

which really

VCS: not $1/4$ of usual pop,

= baseline (or, less)

or $\frac{1}{3}$ (1B): more like $(\frac{1}{2})$ (i.e. SU mes),

(no more!)

in 1982, pop. was?

Burnin/Worson \rightarrow County / Blis / Henry, Branch, Gogo,
Ruthen,

$\rightarrow H \times N \rightarrow 100$ SU arts (A)

(64+)

$\rightarrow \underline{H} \rightarrow$ ^{SIOP-62; Burn-Pok -}
~~DM~~ true winter

Thin snake: Snake-Pok (100A)

= VCS ext of SIOP-62 ($\frac{1}{3}$ pop)

and usual SIOP-62 is a DM (98-99%)

Reback — saws with lime on MT; ^{yield}

In 1961, big MT, big yield —

has (P) under the side of ^{valleys}
much smaller MT is smaller, more numerous
grasses & small valleys on
large cut — now
more than 1 large yield!

Calco. now trees a fine MT of small yields
to get MT of scale

9-22-10

WJ "call" sub to surface
(y what?)

outside guarantee
Orlov - review of 5-59

My app: to ^{try to} place
OUSA (like bluebook)
JCS

McLendon Commander of Atlantic (Newington)
Ray Sleightt Comd Off, Com

Long 10

Wanted K have been willing to cover
(within Turkey) - as I expected - on
Oct 28 or Oct 29

within frame of Castro strategy
was on 28th? as I expected?

yes - he was, Friday night -
if ORK had held fast - as I wanted?
- EEC

(What did Excom expect, Sat?!)
in opposing Turkey deal?!

What would small group have said
about Post-Castro deal (which someone
didn't know about? Sat night -
or Sunday, if ORK offer rejected?

Other, what? attack?!

Bath Bluff:
But K wouldn't have had to - his bluff would
JFK didn't count on that! (C was wild card)

Stoerml?

Andy Buehler ASW officer on ?

9-21-15

(We were right - JFK didn't "know" to

but that was not because JFK simply
saw, "No" as threatened attack
as it fairly appeared. But

but because it was:

JFK was about to lose control
of his ability to hold off attack,
waiting for K to agree
(or, to give in briefly

JFK couldn't stop them

and couldn't deter attacks on them
by threatening K, especially
because (he didn't know)

K couldn't stop attacks
Gibbons were getting closer
(K came to me)

JFK couldn't organize

JFK had to avoid public protests by OCS
(leaks, treason, resignations)

that she was chosen, weak, treasonous

or what the proposal (like CAS '65) [didn't happen - in 1961, 1962, 1963
by doing (giving them) at least 1) blockade
2) recon (and 3) (needs?)
(SAC) + OCAF

9-21-15

Game theory starts:

- Mil. in control (with the win)

- Ego: to protect troops, "win"

- Pre-plans

- Can't "lose" must "win"

(or "betwixt", "trying to win")

Can't let troops "die in vain"

"unnecessary"

Honor, prestige

"fail" (bound to fail)

(w/ country)

C-II Horizontal threat: front to ship

talking all where

talk, to S40s, AA

- mission

shooting "Lima", "RT" - collective

1920, CFR

no regrets!

no regrets! (as in WWI battle!)

tactics/strategy

didn't work for leaders,
either! as in Japan!

2-15-15

Jan 10-23

1

Crisis ended as I expected - K withdrew

but I wouldn't
have expected
at attacking

& light - "no chance" of war - idea of imply
But not for serious & imposed

Cuba (I opposed;
caution)

me to Dillon

Not only because K was outgoing &
in condition [I won't] and seriously
[40K troops, with two ^{was} (he was) (Eve?)
he could have destroyed 2nd front?!
& one troop! (?)

Not because JFK just had him, thanked
(K didn't have to quit 36 hrs before death.)

~~NOT BECAUSE~~ because of JFK.

and he defused

K could have won - with more de power,

SAOs, two was, troops

and more power

(His flaw: Too much power, too long! CA

(and defusing of war,
Too soon!) [too little control

He could have won

of Castro, SAOs,
two was!)

as late as Friday or (Monday,
Sat.)

(Wanted JFK and delayed operation
of his offer but knowing if he'd
known - K had told (Friday night!)

missing from his letter

[and knowledge of
monitors, assass

unknown to JFK?

Wanted CIA-Mafia-Cubans

SAOs

would go together on assass. Castro AND JFK on NOV. 22 JFK assass.
CIA-Mafia: C-I 1960-68

VFR (as I know last night) went
 going to hotel first

He was to go ^{Stearns} Stearns route
 Sunday or Monday

APRIL 12/13

^{VFR} He didn't expect month short - close ^{Sunday}

on basis which he would do (avoid night flows
 + U-2

(was sent Sunday morning?)

K didn't "panic" and began, by
 fear of ^{deliberate} imminent US attack Sunday
 night, would short broadcast Sunday
 night, ^{Moscow} ^{the} ^{Moscow} (Sunday morning DC)

^{Private}
~~Private~~ deal is much less than
 K proposed - almost worthless
 worthless.

Issue: Why did K quit - accept
 VFR proposal ("=" his worried "offer"
 of Friday night, expecting imminent invasion
 (implying) - what he was willing to settle
 for when he expected imminent ^{deliberate} invasion
 (as of ^{Wed?} Thursday - "see what we can get,
 ≥ no-invasion pledge)

- when + as he did - when he was no longer
 worried (Sunday morning, Moscow - about imminent, deliberate invasion -

cont. — and RFK had given his mother 12-36 hours, to decide
on bargaining? Why did he act as if invasion was upon him
(< 12 hours), like timing right? What had been? — SAH, Carter, AA 4p (3)
Crisis ended — when act as it did — too
much

because events were getting/had gotten
out of control of either K or JFK
and were fast approaching an irreversible
explosion;

and JFK was ignorant of the
danger his forces were running
(K hadn't told him) (he couldn't bargain
nor his advisors)

but K knew, knew that JFK didn't
know — his ^{K's} knowledge of recent risks
meant he (knew he) had to be the one
to back off, back down — accept an
offer on the table from his opponent;
he had let things go to a point
where there was no time left
(before a possible explosion)
to ripen his opponent
or to make a counter-offer.

K didn't know:

— JFK was on the verge of
accepting his last offer (perhaps next day)
~~break~~ (- sub dual: that would have
confirmed his decision)

JFK wanted to
accept last. moving
BIG SECRET

JFK didn't know:

- Castro out of K's control - hence, JFK's
(see No)

- Two more (no PALS; ^{control} ~~being~~ delegation; out of K's

- 40 K SU troops

- SAM out of K's control

K didn't know:

- US means: out of JFK's control (hence,

- US challenges out of JFK's control.

(Varying being

U-2 over SU

K did not "lose" / quit when he did

(despite 2nd morning DC ~~control~~ pre - U-2/SAM

K ~~option~~ - Just trade

(\approx minutes staying in Cuba

U-2 ~~Pol~~
AA
(sub-dual)

so, there

gives him his

new advantage

in Berlin, \approx missiles

Does he quit up

Cuba? NO!

two more do stay, + no-missile pledge

(helps K on Berlin, like ICBMs:

- uphold US-SU equality

- disparaging NATO, undermining US

cred and leadership

(Will US sacrifice cities for Berlin?

when it removes NATO warrior

to get Cuban missiles withheld?

And can't threaten SU missiles out

without a trade?

He can see,

two more out

under control of

local command

(40K): more convincing

than NATO/US protection of

Berlin (more valuable than Cuba) (protected by US ICBMs; as K claimed by Cuba, 1961!

So, bluff-friendship - making intruding displays
and threats (animals, birds, gorillas) on the edge of
a prelude (without any intention suicide/murder)

What if Castro had shot down 2 planes (it hit!)
on latency? or suicidal? or US interrupts?
Could JFK really have

1)

and brought back - & the crowd - close to
an expression

(and our - K - knew it, better than JFK.

JFK found ultimate means by K

SAK


AA

which he hoped to defuse by threats
(but wasn't sure he would succeed)

actually, K (knew he) was not in
control: Castro (& his peeps!) were
not under his control, nor his SAK!
(verbal?)

(nor JFK's chatterbox!)


OKINAWA!



RF:
"I am
shaking
tremor
fence":
"I will
stop"
HIPPOS

One driver playing Chicken (K) knows
he is losing brake fluid fast (or his steering
wheel is coming loose) - he is about to lose
control - and knows the other driver doesn't know it!

(No., openly throwing out steering wheel; when brake, start ^{SWERVE.}

(~~Diagram~~ Figure:  tank

tank stopped; like RF for me, & Shirley

but: second, ball-layer

Brigitte Willson

loss of control:

At a certain point (when slots are filled,
exchanged)

Events get out of control, top,
control: leaders (if they survive) (or not)
can't stop, brake, manipulate, change plans

- ~~Cover~~ breaks down (first few moves!)

- lower-levels must make choices, without
waiting to inform higher commands or for their
reply: improvised

9 things follow old plans

- pressure on lower commands: "about to die" (Scout)
or "target about to disappear,"
others are being
shot down

- going to lose moves

first battles
in air war

(observed)

- pressure on Pres - from unl.
from Congress

(possible repression, or comp)

"no choice"

Kiss - shots in Madison Square
Court to Pass - the flies

7

Arms flies

Massachusetts - prison (chris)

Batista flies

John flies

(Din does not -
till too late)

Democratic does not -

till too late

Castro does not

GVN does not, in 1964-65

Ho does not

Goldwater - camp

JFK - school

(MLK, Malcolm X, RFK

(like Tarzillo, Din with JFK
not Castro)

(.

I thought:

= All JFK had to do was say,
 "Get the out" (you had no business,
 no mail, no rights (you're #2) to
 have the them)
 or we'll blow the up" (me to Dick)
 and stay with that: "see me tomorrow"
 and K had to do it - and deployment
 and he said it.

I was right.

Risk was 1/100 (^{As} 1/1000)

But Mike was right: (why?)
 on prob. He knew balance. (?)
 did he believe it?

K right not get out, and right away
 to "call on bluff" (JFK was bluffing,
 though VCS not)

and 1) JFK ^{low prob.} right not be bluffing, attack
MRBMs go off

(Mike didn't know of the war,
 rules, SAC, AA out of control, especially
 "or SAC does something" (not O prob.))

anyway, both present in threats
 while forces operate in Cuba.

A + DS + VCS or K meets in Berlin, Turkey
 know right about that (really low prob. - but not in JFK yes!)

and 10% of ~~or~~ higher.

crisis persists, to a point
where forces are operating in
an environment of conflict
under a spark (the intention
irrevocable here) is likely, and high
the 10% is S-R

see WWI

(not fact in China
or (Pearl Harbor)
or Hitch

10% chance crisis will lead to a
saturation, where

like Berlin → Oct - 1961

(Wg was K still pushing us in
Berlin - after first speech
NATO WALL

NIE - Belkater

deadline dropped?

Lighter - tanks

WWK - "most dangerous" moment
(not knowing, saturation)

Our foothold in Ukraine / Kiev = Cuba?
 include = Berlin?

in R "empire" (Divided Ukraine: VN
 East Ukraine = Cuba for R/Putin
 Berlin (included)
 Kennedy
 Postmaster

"I'm not going to lose it;

"It's threatened; I'll threaten EU"

or hand-over [Recent ^{Cuba, Kiev} ~~reignition~~: threatened by "fast
 offshore islands of "natural resources"
 China, Germany,
 US)

South VN

(South Korea)

(Korean 1958)

"Nuclear Option"

Extremely disproportionate threat

(to carry out: illegal, immoral
act, to threaten? risk?

invoking nuclear (& nuclear)
devastation

supposedly, threat
invokes "no risk"
(bluff; "if you do it,
I can & will control it;
'/100, '/1000, negligible
like a. i. 6/14

- Nothing risk of Cong. filibuster

- Defaulting on ^{US} gov debt
Sanctioning gov down

"Nuclear Strategy - Brexit - defaulting on gov debt
- ~~leaving~~ leaving EU (or, EC)

(the war GW

Committee (out, threats; singly, refusal/ failure
to coop. on restrictions (costs: opportunity
of profits; 600
Costs of Transition

DE:

We don't know/ know/
feel/act (as if we know)
"which is more likely:
and that is \neq ="

Probes
(Outing.)

{ That some it will be carried out
Not sure it will

Specifically not definite (or) relative (not just, not precise; not $>$, $<$, $=$)
"hot definite relation"
"vague" Lawrence, Probb

WK0007

9-30-15

All demons have a capacity for (being in) denial.

All demons, all the time, are in denial about things.

(Fortunately, not everyone is in denial about everything all the time).

(Vs. Heisen - you can find denial of the public example of the time.*

* = many all.

Christ (cf?) "Heisen ^{been} cannot stand ~~the~~ very much reality." 4 Quartets

Heisen: "I can not deny the truth."

"any man will deny known truth," (?)

Heisen, every kind of every behavior are made - den, not bluff.

- not and credible
- not can be applied
- or not believed, not bluff, blow up crisis.

and that was great —

It was dangerous — not (very lesson)
became with JFK & K were ^{much} more
reckless than any before or after

(Well, K was;
not more than A?)

as the (JFK) GWB?...

but became this thanks

indefinitely left something to chance (>0)

TCS

Bankruptcy

(Rise to US from US FS based less than
almost again improved in US:

but not to Europe, Eurasia!

(or really, to world - still:
that

0) Effect of US FS.

1) Warning Rise of US attack on Cuba — warning —
was incredibly greater than again in US knew
for 30 years!

2) and VCS (in JFK) pressure / desire to
attack (in ignorance) for years then of.
(not-learned of Moscow & Warsaw) injured!

(Fortunately, CBI was also unavailable for VCS less
available, the necessity of JFK lethal!]

9-1-15

On War Plans + Alliances

mostly: K rejects notion of
"misadventure"

Yet it is a constant threat
in his decision-making

(Berlin)

Wells "test"

So plans ~~may~~ for Europe:

C-II

(Stalin: Korea)

and JFK's: (C-I) C-II

(Blockade)

(+ H, (CBI - Laos?))

Note pretty minor in:

He could / should have succeeded

would have if:

even given ^{these} ~~these~~ except for Castro

(Admiral all wrong)

8-30-15

The danger of new war is intolerable 10 PM
and unavoidable (unending, unregulated
not-intable, avoidable)
not because of (many, or limited to)

- Proving beyond US - D ~~the~~ beyond Plan-5
(Exp. ~~new~~, ~~not~~, ~~new~~
NK
- Proving beyond ~~the~~ ~~the~~ 9
(from...

- Proving to "Congo, Congo state"
(strong belief groups, etc.
very dangerous)

or to less product, more needs
better than US president or in SU usually seen

It's emphasizing some of health, even
productive (concerning to improve K work -
"How could be have
the fit be could"
Hobbes

to need that rich were between...
just despite this being more concerns
than they appeared (or pretended to be)
and as concerns or (hardness)
we can report, even can't politics;

Rails are as great new - (before further proof)

(4) called his bluff (grace, Bill Clinton)
Muhmury

and his own to lose Greece

⇒ Euro balance, across Berlin (GDR)
and f

Could have worked: give ability to purchase
blockade, it should have worked!

Point: World about blow up
NOT measure with K & SEE
was extraordinary reckless
or so reckless/bold/aggressive
into the approach + potential during crisis;
(bluffing)

It's even not more reckless than
current market

(or, say, default - Pak)

(don't say: OK (?))
(increased to 100%)

or OBL/AQ--1

(1515: We are not good "politicians")

(us. controlled aggression, yes
or, committing it!)

esp. now is OK

In late 1958 (after Berlin W.C.) K secretly deploys
ARMY to QDR — to threaten Korea & Pots.

(after Aug '56).

(NOT good enough — no. "hostages")

and not break US monopoly of power
to dictate control of affairs — 1st or 2nd

C-II

Dear K

withdrawing

end of - year deadline
on Proven Treaty/GOR

:(don't for does!)

negotiation!

(could reform?)

Admission? F?

Admission?)

before September?

or, fine with another
it?

"No gap" [auto:
10x1 US]

4 (auto)